Virnetx Holding (VHC) Risk Analysis

Our Restated Bylaws provide that, unless we consent in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the sole and exclusive forum for (1) any derivative action or proceeding brought on our behalf, (2) any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any of our directors, stockholders, officers, or other employees to us or our stockholders, (3) any action arising pursuant to any provision of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or our Restated Charter or Restated Bylaws or (4) any other action asserting a claim that is governed by the internal affairs doctrine shall be the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware (or, if the Court of Chancery does not have jurisdiction, another State court in Delaware or the federal district court for the District of Delaware), in all cases subject to the court having jurisdiction over indispensable parties named as defendants. However, notwithstanding the exclusive forum provisions, our Restated Bylaws explicitly state that they would not preclude the filing of claims brought to enforce any liability or duty created under federal securities laws, including the Securities Act or the Exchange Act. Any person or entity purchasing or otherwise acquiring any interest in any of our securities shall be deemed to have notice of and consented to this provision. This exclusive-forum provision may limit a stockholder's ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum of its choosing for disputes with us or our directors, officers, or other employees, which may discourage lawsuits against us and our directors, officers, and other employees. If a court were to find this exclusive-forum provision in our Restated Bylaws to be inapplicable or unenforceable in an action, we may incur additional costs associated with resolving the dispute in other jurisdictions, which could harm our results of operations.

We have protective provisions in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation (Restated Charter) and amended and restated bylaws (Restated Bylaws) that could delay, discourage, or prevent a third party from acquiring control of us without the approval of our Board of Directors. These protective provisions include: - A staggered Board of Directors: Only one or two of five directors will be up for election at any given annual meeting, delaying the ability of stockholders to affect a change in control of us because it would take two annual meetings to effectively replace a majority of the Board of Directors. - Blank check preferred stock: Our Board of Directors has the authority to establish the rights, preferences, and privileges of our 10,000,000 authorized, but unissued, shares of preferred stock. Therefore, this stock may be issued at the discretion of our Board of Directors with preferences over your shares of our common stock in a manner that is materially dilutive to you. In addition, blank check preferred stock can be used to create a "poison pill" which is designed to deter a hostile bidder from buying a controlling interest in our stock without the approval of our Board of Directors. We have not adopted such a "poison pill;" but our Board of Directors can do so in the future, very rapidly and without stockholder approval. - Advance notice requirements for director nominations and for business to be brought before stockholder meetings: Stockholders wishing to submit director nominations or raise matters to a vote of the stockholders must provide notice to us within very specific date windows and in very specific form to have the matter voted on at a stockholder meeting. This gives our Board of Directors and management more time to react to stockholder proposals generally and could also permit us to disregard a stockholder proposal to the extent such proposal is not submitted in accordance with the Restated Bylaws. - No stockholder actions by written consent: No stockholder or group of stockholders may take action by written consent. Along with the advance notice requirements described above, this provision also gives our Board of Directors and management more time to react to proposed stockholder actions. - Super majority requirement for stockholder amendments to the Restated Bylaws: Stockholder proposals to alter or amend our Restated Bylaws or to adopt new bylaws can only be approved by the affirmative vote of at least 66 2/3% of the outstanding shares of our common stock. - No ability of stockholders to call a special meeting of the stockholders: A special meeting of the stockholders, other than as required by statute, may be called at any time by the Board of Directors, the chairman of the Board of Directors, or the president, and any power of stockholders to call a special meeting of stockholders is specifically denied. Accordingly, stockholders, even those who represent a significant percentage of our shares of common stock, may need to wait for the annual meeting before nominating directors or raising other business proposals to be voted on by the stockholders. In addition, the provisions of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law govern us. These provisions may prohibit large stockholders, particularly those owning 15% or more of our outstanding voting stock, from merging or combining with us for a certain period of time. These and other provisions in our Restated Charter, our Restated Bylaws and under Delaware law could discourage potential takeover attempts, reduce the price that investors might be willing to pay for shares of our common stock in the future and result in the market price being lower than it would be without these provisions.

As of December 31, 2025, our executive officers and directors beneficially owned approximately 16% of our outstanding common stock. Because of their beneficial ownership interest, our officers and directors could significantly influence stockholder actions. This ability to exercise significant influence could prevent or significantly delay another company from acquiring or merging with us.