Annaly Capital (NLY) Risk Analysis

Our Board has established very broad investment guidelines that may be amended from time to time. Our Board and management determine all of our significant policies, including our investment, financing, capital and asset allocation and distribution policies. They have in the past and may in the future amend or revise these policies at any time without a vote of our stockholders, or otherwise initiate a change in asset allocation. Policy changes could adversely affect our financial condition, results of operations, the market price of our common stock or our ability to pay dividends or distributions.

Our current investment strategy includes seeking growth in our residential credit business. The holder of a mortgage or mortgage-backed securities assumes the risk that the related borrowers may default on their obligations to make full and timely payments of principal and interest. Under our investment policy, we have the ability to acquire non-Agency mortgage-backed securities, residential whole loans, MSR and other investment assets of lower credit quality. In general, non-Agency mortgage-backed securities carry greater investment risk than Agency mortgage-backed securities because they are not guaranteed as to principal or interest by the U.S. Government, any federal agency or any federally chartered corporation. Non-investment grade, non-Agency securities tend to be less liquid, may have a higher risk of default and may be more difficult to value than investment grade bonds. Higher-than-expected rates of default and/or higher-than-expected loss severities on the mortgages underlying our non-Agency mortgage-backed securities, MSR or on our residential whole loan investments may adversely affect the value of those assets. Accordingly, defaults in the payment of principal and/or interest on our non-Agency mortgage-backed securities, residential whole loan investments, MSR and other investment assets of lower credit quality have in the past and may in the future result in our incurring losses of income from, and/or losses in market value relating to, these assets. We have certain investments in non-Agency mortgage-backed securities backed by collateral pools containing mortgage loans that were originated under underwriting standards that were less strict than those used in underwriting “prime mortgage loans.” These lower standards permitted mortgage loans, often with LTV ratios in excess of 80%, to be made to borrowers having impaired credit histories, lower credit scores, higher debt-to-income ratios and/or unverified income. Difficult economic conditions, including increased interest rates and lower home prices, have in the past and may in the future result in non-prime and subprime mortgage loans having increased rates of delinquency, foreclosure, bankruptcy and loss (including such as during the credit crisis of 2007-2008 and the housing crisis that followed), and are likely to otherwise experience delinquency, foreclosure, bankruptcy and loss rates that are higher, and that may be substantially higher, than those experienced by mortgage loans underwritten in a more traditional manner. Thus, because of higher delinquency rates and losses associated with non-prime and subprime mortgage loans, the performance of our non-Agency mortgage-backed securities that are backed by these types of loans could be correspondingly adversely affected, which could materially adversely impact our results of operations, financial condition and business.

We are subject to reinvestment risk as a result of changes in interest rates. Declines in interest rates are generally accompanied by increased prepayments of mortgage loans, which in turn results in a prepayment of the related mortgage-backed securities. An increase in prepayments has in the past and may in the future result in the reinvestment of the proceeds we receive from such prepayments into lower yielding assets. Conversely, increases in interest rates are generally accompanied by decreased prepayments of mortgage loans, which have in the past and may in the future reduce our capital available to reinvest into higher-yielding assets.

A significant component of the fair value of CRT and non-Agency securities and other credit risk-oriented investments is attributable to the credit spread, or the difference between the value of the credit instrument and the value of a financial instrument with similar interest rate exposure, but with no credit risk, such as a U.S. Treasury note. Credit spreads can be highly volatile and have in the past and may in the future fluctuate due to changes in economic conditions, liquidity, investor demand and other factors. Credit spreads typically widen in times of increased market uncertainty or when economic conditions have or are expected to deteriorate. Credit spreads may also widen due to actual or anticipated rating downgrades on the securities or similar securities. Hedging fair value changes associated with credit spreads may be inefficient and our hedging strategies are not primarily designed to mitigate credit spread risk. Widening credit spreads could cause net unrealized gains to decrease or result in net losses.

Our policies permit us to enter into interest rate swaps, caps and floors, interest rate swaptions, interest rate futures, and other derivative transactions to help us mitigate our interest rate and prepayment risks described in other risk factors subject to maintaining our qualification as a REIT and our Investment Company Act exemption. We have used interest rate swaps and options to enter into interest rate swaps (commonly referred to as interest rate swaptions) to provide a level of protection against interest rate risks. We may also purchase or sell TBAs on Agency mortgage-backed securities, purchase or write put or call options on TBAs, invest in other types of mortgage derivatives, such as interest-only securities, and hold short positions in U.S. Treasury securities. No hedging strategy can protect us completely. Interest rate hedging may fail to protect or could adversely affect us because, among other things: interest rate hedging can be expensive, particularly during periods of volatile interest rates; available hedges may not correspond directly with the risk for which protection is sought; and the duration of the hedge may not match the duration of the related asset or liability.

In connection with the acquisition and securitization of residential whole loans, we rely on unaffiliated servicing companies to service and manage the mortgages underlying our non-Agency mortgage-backed securities and our residential whole loans. If a servicer is not vigilant in seeing that borrowers make their required monthly payments, borrowers may be less likely to make these payments, resulting in a higher frequency of default. If a servicer takes longer to liquidate non-performing mortgages, our losses related to those loans may be higher than originally anticipated. Any failure by servicers to service these mortgages and related real estate owned (“REO”) properties impacts the value of these investments and our financial performance. In addition, while we have contracted, and will continue to contract, with unaffiliated servicing companies to carry out the actual servicing of the loans we purchase together with the related MSR (including all direct interface with the borrowers), we are nevertheless ultimately responsible, vis-à-vis the borrowers and state and federal regulators, for ensuring that the loans are serviced in accordance with the terms of the related notes and mortgages and applicable law and regulation. In light of the current regulatory environment, such exposure could be significant even though we might have contractual claims against our servicers for any failure to service the loans to the required standard. A default by the mortgage servicer in its capacity as servicer and/or failure of the mortgage servicer to perform its obligations related to any MSR have in the past and may in the future result in a loss of value of servicing fees and/or excess servicing spread. Mortgage servicers are subject to extensive federal, state and local laws, regulations and administrative decisions and failure to comply with such regulations can expose the servicer to fines, damages and losses. In the capacity of servicer, mortgage servicers operate in a highly litigious industry that subject it to potential lawsuits related to billing and collections practices, modification protocols or foreclosure practices. When a residential whole loan we own is foreclosed upon, title to the underlying property would be taken by one of our subsidiaries. The foreclosure process, especially in judicial foreclosure states such as New York, Florida and New Jersey can be lengthy and expensive, and the delays and costs involved in completing a foreclosure, and then liquidating the property through sale, may materially increase any related loss. Finally, at such time as title is taken to a foreclosed property, it may require more extensive rehabilitation than we estimated at acquisition or a previously unknown environmental liability may be discovered that would require expensive and time-consuming remediation. Additionally, given the magnitude of the 2008-2009 housing crisis, and in response to the well-publicized failures of many servicers to follow proper foreclosure procedures, mortgage servicers are being held to much higher foreclosure-related documentation standards than they previously were. However, because many mortgages have been transferred and assigned multiple times (and by means of varying assignment procedures) throughout the origination, warehouse, and securitization processes, mortgage servicers have generally had much more difficulty furnishing the requisite documentation to initiate or complete foreclosures. In addition, unexpected macro-level events such as the COVID-19 pandemic or natural disasters have led, and could continue to lead, to delays in the foreclosure process, both by operation of state law (e.g., foreclosure moratoriums in certain states) and by delays in the judicial system. These circumstances have led to stalled or suspended foreclosure proceedings, and ultimately additional foreclosure-related costs. Foreclosure-related delays also tend to increase ultimate loan loss severities as a result of property deterioration, amplified legal and other costs, and other factors. Many factors delaying foreclosure, such as borrower lawsuits and judicial backlog and scrutiny, are outside of a servicer's control and have delayed, and will likely continue to delay, foreclosure processing in both judicial states (where foreclosures require court involvement) and non-judicial states. The concerns about deficiencies in foreclosure practices of servicers and related delays in the foreclosure process may impact our loss assumptions and has affected and may continue to affect the values of, and our returns on, our investments in residential whole loans.

The performance of the loans underlying our MSR related assets is subject to risks associated with inadequate or untimely servicing. If our mortgage servicers commit a material breach of their obligations as a servicer, we may be subject to damages if the breach is not cured within a specified period of time following notice. In addition, poor performance by a mortgage servicer have in the past and may in the future result in greater than expected delinquencies and foreclosures and losses on the mortgage loans underlying our MSR related assets. A substantial increase in our delinquency or foreclosure rate or the inability to process claims could adversely affect our ability to access the capital and secondary markets for our financing needs. Similar to the way in which we service residential whole loans, we have also contracted, and will continue to contract, with unaffiliated servicing companies to carry out the actual servicing activities (including all direct interface with the borrowers). However, we are nevertheless ultimately responsible, vis-à-vis the borrowers and state and federal regulators, for ensuring that these activities are performed in accordance with the terms of the related notes and mortgages and applicable laws and regulations. In light of the current regulatory environment, such exposure could be significant even though we might have contractual claims against our servicers for any failure to service the loans to the required standard. A default by the mortgage servicer in its capacity as servicer and/or failure of the mortgage servicer to perform its obligations related to any MSR could result in a loss of value of servicing fees and/or excess servicing spread. Mortgage servicers are subject to extensive federal, state and local laws, regulations and administrative decisions and failure to comply with such regulations can expose the servicer to fines, damages and losses. In the capacity of servicer, mortgage servicers operate in a highly litigious industry that subject them to potential lawsuits related to billing and collections practices, modification protocols or foreclosure practices.