Ferguson Enterprises (FERG) Risk Analysis

Provisions in the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation and New TopCo Proposed Bylaws, which will become effective at the Effective Time, may discourage, delay or prevent a merger, acquisition or other change in control of New TopCo that certain stockholders may consider favorable, including transactions in which stockholders might otherwise receive a premium for their shares. These provisions could also limit the price that investors might be willing to pay in the future for New TopCo Common Stock, thereby depressing the market price of New TopCo Common Stock. In addition, these provisions may frustrate or prevent any attempts by stockholders of New TopCo to replace or remove its current management by making it more difficult for stockholders to replace members of the Board of Directors of New TopCo (the "New TopCo Board"). Among other things, these provisions: - provide the New TopCo Board the right to issue one or more series of preferred stock, par value $0.0001 per share, of New TopCo ("New TopCo Preferred Stock") and to determine the price and other terms of those shares, including preferences and voting rights, without shareholder approval;- authorize a number of shares of stock that are not yet issued, which would allow the New TopCo Board to issue shares to persons friendly to current management without offering pre-emptive rights to existing stockholders;- permit the New TopCo Board to amend the New TopCo Proposed Bylaws, which may allow the New TopCo Board to take additional actions to prevent an unsolicited takeover and inhibit the ability of an acquirer to amend the bylaws to facilitate an unsolicited takeover attempt;- prohibit stockholders from taking action by written consent;- provide the New TopCo Board with the sole authority to determine the number of directors of the New TopCo Board and to fill vacancies on the New TopCo Board (whether resulting from any increase in the authorized number of directors or otherwise); and - establish advance notice and other requirements for nominations of candidates for election to the New TopCo Board or for proposing matters that can be acted on by stockholders at the annual or special meetings of stockholders. As a Delaware corporation, New TopCo will be subject to provisions of Delaware law, including Section 203 of the DGCL. Section 203 of the DGCL provides (in general) that, unless certain conditions have been met, New TopCo may not engage in a business combination with an interested stockholder (generally defined as a stockholder of New TopCo, together with his or her affiliates or associates, who owns more than 15% of New TopCo's voting stock) for a period of three years after the time of the transaction in which the person became an interested stockholder. The prohibition on business combinations with interested stockholders does not apply in some cases, including if: (1) the New TopCo Board, prior to the time of the transaction in which the stockholder became an interested stockholder, approves the business combination or the transaction in which the stockholder becomes an interested stockholder; (2) upon consummation of the transaction that resulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85% of the voting stock (excluding stock owned by certain persons) of New TopCo outstanding at the time the transaction commenced; or (3) at or after the time of the person became an interested stockholder, the New TopCo Board and the holders of at least two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock not owned by the interested stockholder approve, at an annual or special meeting of stockholders, and not by written consent, the business combination. Any provision of the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation, the New TopCo Proposed Bylaws or Delaware law that has the effect of delaying or deterring a change in control could limit the opportunity for New TopCo stockholders to receive a premium for their New TopCo Common Stock and affect the price that some investors are willing to pay for the New TopCo Common Stock.

The New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation provides that, subject to certain exceptions, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware (the "Court of Chancery") will, to the fullest extent permitted by law, be the sole and exclusive forum for (i) any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of New TopCo, (ii) any action asserting a claim of breach of a duty (including any fiduciary duty) by, or other wrongdoing by, any current or former director, officer, employee, agent or stockholder of New TopCo to New TopCo or New TopCo's stockholders, (iii) any action asserting a claim against New TopCo or any current or former director, officer, employee, agent or stockholder of New TopCo arising out of or relating to any provision of the DGCL, the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation or the New TopCo Proposed Bylaws, (iv) any action to interpret, apply, enforce or determine the validity of the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation or the New TopCo Proposed Bylaws, (v) any action asserting a claim against New TopCo or any current or former director, officer, employee, agent or stockholder of New TopCo governed by the internal affairs doctrine, (vi) any action asserting an "internal corporate claim" as that term is defined in Section 115 of the DGCL or (vii) any action as to which the DGCL confers jurisdiction on the Court of Chancery. In addition, to prevent having to litigate claims in multiple jurisdictions and the threat of inconsistent or contrary rulings by different courts, among other considerations, the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation provides that, unless New TopCo consents in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, to the fullest extent permitted by law, the federal district courts of the U.S. will be the sole and exclusive forum for resolving any complaint asserting a cause of action arising under the U.S. Securities Act of 1933, as amended (the "U.S. Securities Act") against New TopCo or any director, officer, employee or agent of New TopCo. These exclusive-forum provisions may limit a stockholder's ability to bring a claim in a judicial forum that it finds favorable for disputes with New TopCo or its directors, officers, employees, agents or stockholders and this limitation may have the effect of discouraging lawsuits or make New TopCo securities less attractive to investors. For example, stockholders who bring a claim in the Court of Chancery could face additional litigation costs in pursuing any such claim, particularly if they do not reside in or near the State of Delaware. The Court of Chancery may also reach different judgments or results than would other courts, including courts where a stockholder considering an action may be located or would otherwise choose to bring the action, and such judgments or results may be more favorable to New TopCo than to its stockholders. It should also be noted that Section 22 of the U.S. Securities Act creates concurrent jurisdiction for federal and state courts over all suits brought to enforce any duty or liability created by the U.S. Securities Act or the rules and regulations thereunder. Accordingly, both state and federal courts have jurisdiction to entertain such claims. Due to such concurrent jurisdiction, there is uncertainty as to whether a court would enforce the exclusive forum provision in the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation in respect of causes of action arising under the U.S. Securities Act against New TopCo or any director, officer, employee or agent of New TopCo. While the Delaware courts have determined that such choice of forum provisions are facially valid, a stockholder may nevertheless seek to bring such a claim arising under the U.S. Securities Act against New TopCo, its directors, officers, employees, agents or stockholders in a venue other than in the federal district courts of the U.S. In such instance, New TopCo would expect to vigorously assert the validity and enforceability of the exclusive forum provisions of the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation. This may require significant additional costs associated with resolving such action in other jurisdictions and New TopCo cannot assure you that the provisions will be enforced by a court in those other jurisdictions. If a court were to find the exclusive-forum provisions in the New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation to be inapplicable or unenforceable in an action, New TopCo may incur further significant additional costs associated with resolving the dispute in other jurisdictions, all of which could harm New TopCo's business. The New TopCo Proposed Certificate of Incorporation provides that any person purchasing or otherwise acquiring or holding any interest in shares of capital stock of New TopCo shall be deemed to have notice of and to have consented to the exclusive forum provisions described above. However, these exclusive forum provisions may not apply to suits brought to enforce a duty or liability vested in the exclusive jurisdiction of a court or forum other than the Court of Chancery, such as those created by the Exchange Act, or any other claim for which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction.

Ferguson intends for the Merger to qualify as a "reorganisation of share capital" pursuant to Section 136 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992 for the purposes of U.K. taxation of chargeable gains (the "Intended U.K. CGT Treatment"). Ferguson has obtained statutory clearance from His Majesty's Revenue and Customs ("HMRC") (under Section 138 of the Taxation of Chargeable Gains Act 1992) that HMRC are satisfied that the Merger will be effected for bona fide commercial reasons and will not form part of a scheme of arrangement of which the main purpose, or one of the main purposes, is avoidance of liability to U.K. taxation of chargeable gains ("U.K. CGT"). However, while this statutory clearance confirms the non-application of certain anti-avoidance provisions, there can be no assurance that HMRC will not challenge the Intended U.K. CGT Treatment on other grounds or that a court will not sustain such a challenge. If HMRC were to be successful in any such contention, or if for any other reason the Intended U.K. CGT Treatment were to not be respected for U.K. tax purposes, the Merger could be a taxable event to Ferguson Shareholders for U.K. CGT purposes. Ferguson Shareholders are urged to consult with their own tax advisors with respect to the tax consequences of the Merger. For purposes of this discussion, a "U.K. Holder" refers to shareholders who are resident, and in the case of individuals domiciled, for tax purposes in (and only in) the U.K. (except insofar as express reference is made to the treatment of non-U.K. residents), who hold their Ferguson Shares and will hold their New TopCo Common Stock as an investment (other than where a tax exemption applies, for example where the Ferguson Shares or the New TopCo Common Stock are held in an individual savings account or pension arrangement) and who are the absolute beneficial owner of both the Ferguson Shares and New TopCo Common Stock and any dividends paid on them.

Ferguson has not analyzed the impact of the Merger in all jurisdictions and it is possible that the Merger would be viewed as taxable to shareholders in jurisdictions other than the U.S. and U.K. Ferguson Shareholders are urged to consult with their own tax advisors with respect to their specific tax consequences of the Merger.