Qualcomm (QCOM) Risk Analysis

From time to time, companies initiate various strategies to attempt to negotiate, renegotiate, reduce and/or eliminate their need to pay royalties to us for the use of our intellectual property. These strategies have included: (i) litigation, often alleging infringement of patents held by such companies, patent misuse, patent exhaustion, patent invalidity or unenforceability of our patents or licenses, alleging that we do not license our patents on fair, reasonable and nondiscriminatory (FRAND) terms, or alleging some form of unfair competition or competition law violation; (ii) taking positions contrary to our understanding (and/or the plain language) of their contracts with us; (iii) appeals to governmental authorities; (iv) collective action, including working with wireless operators, standards bodies, other like-minded companies and organizations, on both formal and informal bases, to adopt intellectual property policies and practices that could have the effect of limiting returns on intellectual property innovations; (v) lobbying governmental regulators and elected officials for the purpose of seeking the reduction of royalty rates or the base on which royalties are calculated, seeking to impose some form of compulsory licensing or weakening a patent holder's ability to enforce its rights or obtain a fair return for such rights; and (vi) attempts by licensees to shift their royalty obligation to their suppliers in order to make royalty collection more difficult or reduce the amount of royalties collected. In addition, certain licensees have disputed, underreported, underpaid, not reported or not paid royalties owed to us under their license agreements or reported to us in a manner that is not in compliance with their contractual obligations, and certain companies have yet to enter into or have delayed entering into or renewing license agreements with us for their use of our intellectual property, and they or others may engage in such behavior in the future. The fact that one or more licensees dispute, underreport, underpay, do not report or do not pay royalties owed to us may encourage other licensees to take similar actions or not renew their existing license agreements, and may encourage other licensees or unlicensed companies to delay entering into, or to not enter into, new license agreements. Further, to the extent such licensees and companies increase their device share, the negative impact of their underreporting, underpayment, non-payment or non-reporting on our business, revenues, results of operations, cash flows and financial condition will be exacerbated. We have been in the past and are currently subject to various litigation and/or governmental investigations and proceedings. Certain of these matters are described in this Annual Report in "Notes to Consolidated Financial Statements, Note 7. Commitments and Contingencies." We may become subject to other litigation or governmental investigations or proceedings in the future. Additionally, certain of our direct and indirect customers and licensees have pursued, and others may in the future pursue, litigation or arbitration against us related to our business. Unfavorable resolutions of one or more of these matters have had and could in the future have a material adverse effect on our business, revenues, results of operations, cash flows and financial condition. See also the Risk Factors below titled "Changes in our patent licensing practices, whether due to governmental investigations, legal challenges or otherwise, could adversely impact our business and results of operations" and "Our business may suffer as a result of adverse rulings in governmental investigations or proceedings or other legal proceedings." In addition, in connection with our participation in SDOs, we, like other patent owners, generally have made contractual commitments to such organizations to license those of our patents that would necessarily be infringed by standard-compliant products as set forth in those commitments (referred to as standard-essential patents). Some manufacturers and users of standard-compliant products advance interpretations of these commitments that are adverse to our licensing business, including interpretations that would limit the amount of royalties that we could collect on the licensing of our standard-essential patent portfolio. Further, some third parties have proposed significant changes to existing intellectual property policies for implementation by SDOs and other industry organizations with the goal of significantly devaluing standard-essential patents. For example, some have put forth proposals which would require a maximum aggregate intellectual property royalty rate for the use of all standard-essential patents owned by all of the member companies to be applied to the selling price of any product implementing the relevant standard. They have further proposed that such maximum aggregate royalty rate be apportioned to each member company with standard-essential patents based upon the number of standard-essential patents held by such company. Others have proposed that injunctions should not be an available remedy for infringement of standard-essential patents and have made proposals that could severely limit damage awards and other remedies by courts for patent infringement (e.g., by limiting the base upon which the royalty rate may be applied). A number of these strategies are purportedly based on interpretations of the policies of certain SDOs concerning the licensing of patents that are or may be essential to industry standards and on our (or other companies') alleged failure to abide by these policies. Some SDOs, courts and governmental agencies have adopted, and may in the future adopt, some or all of these interpretations or proposals in a manner adverse to our interests, including in litigation to which we may not be a party. Further, SDOs in certain countries may attempt to modify widely accepted standards and claim the resulting standard as their own. In addition, governments may enact policies concerning standard-essential patents, such as the European Commission's proposed regulations which would create a new regulatory scheme for standard-essential patents, that may have various consequences, some of which may be detrimental, such as by devaluing standard-essential patents or disrupting worldwide technology standards. Other jurisdictions may adopt similar regulatory schemes, which could also have such effects. We expect that such proposals, interpretations and strategies will continue in the future, and if successful, our business model would be harmed, either by limiting or eliminating our ability to collect royalties (or by reducing the royalties we can collect) on all or a portion of our standard-essential patent portfolio, limiting our return on investment with respect to new technologies, limiting our ability to seek injunctions against infringers of our standard-essential patents, constraining our ability to make licensing commitments when submitting our technologies for inclusion in future standards (which could make our technologies less likely to be included in such standards) or forcing us to work outside of SDOs or other industry groups to promote our new technologies, and our revenues, results of operations and cash flows could be negatively impacted. In addition, the legal and other costs associated with asserting or defending our positions have been and may in the future be significant. We expect that such challenges, regardless of their merits, will continue into the foreseeable future and will require the investment of substantial management time and financial resources. Due to the higher margin contribution of our licensing business relative to our chipset business, any reduction in licensing revenues could have a disproportionate impact on the cash resources we have available for other purposes, such as research and development.