Envista Holdings (NVST) Risk Analysis

Our second amended and restated certificate of incorporation, as amended, provides that unless our Board of Directors otherwise determines, the state courts in the State of Delaware or, if no state court located within the State of Delaware has jurisdiction, the federal court for the District of Delaware, will be the sole and exclusive forum for any derivative action or proceeding brought on behalf of us, any action asserting a claim of breach of a fiduciary duty owed by any of our directors, officers, employees or stockholders to us or our stockholders, any action asserting a claim arising pursuant to any provision of the DGCL or our second amended and restated certificate of incorporation, as amended, or third amended and restated bylaws, or any action asserting a claim governed by the internal affairs doctrine. This provision would not apply to claims brought to enforce a duty or liability created by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, or any other claim for which the federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction. In addition, our third amended and restated bylaws provide that the federal district courts of the U.S. will be the exclusive forum for resolving any complaint asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, unless we consent in writing to the selection of an alternative forum. These exclusive forum provisions may limit the ability of our stockholders to bring a claim in a judicial forum that such stockholders find favorable for disputes with us or our directors or officers, which may discourage such lawsuits against us and our directors, officers, employees and stockholders.

Our second amended and restated certificate of incorporation, as amended, and third amended and restated bylaws contain, and Delaware law contains, provisions that are intended to deter coercive takeover practices and inadequate takeover bids and to encourage prospective acquirers to negotiate with our Board of Directors rather than to attempt an unsolicited takeover not approved by our Board of Directors. These provisions include, among others: ?the inability of our stockholders to call a special meeting;?the inability of our stockholders to act by written consent;?rules regarding how stockholders may present proposals or nominate directors for election at stockholder meetings;?the right of our Board of Directors to issue preferred stock without stockholder approval; and ?the ability of our directors, and not stockholders, to fill vacancies (including those resulting from an enlargement of our Board of Directors) on our Board of Directors. Additionally, certain provisions in the Notes and the Indenture governing the Notes could make a third party attempt to acquire us more difficult or expensive. For example, if a takeover constitutes a fundamental change, then holders of the Notes will have the right to require us to repurchase their Notes for cash. In addition, if a takeover constitutes a make-whole fundamental change, then we may be required to temporarily increase the conversion rate. In either case, and in other cases, our obligations under the Notes and the Indenture could increase the cost of acquiring us or otherwise discourage a third party from acquiring us or removing incumbent management, including in a transaction that holders of our securities may view as favorable. In addition, because we have not chosen to be exempt from Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the "DGCL"), this provision could also delay or prevent a change of control that you may favor. Section 203 provides that, subject to limited exceptions, persons that acquire, or are affiliated with a person that acquires, more than 15% of the outstanding voting stock of a Delaware corporation (an "interested stockholder") shall not engage in any business combination with that corporation, including by merger, consolidation or acquisitions of additional shares, for a three-year period following the date on which the person became an interested stockholder, unless (i) prior to such time, the board of directors of such corporation approved either the business combination or the transaction that resulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder; (ii) upon consummation of the transaction that resulted in the stockholder becoming an interested stockholder, the interested stockholder owned at least 85% of the voting stock of such corporation at the time the transaction commenced (excluding for purposes of determining the voting stock outstanding (but not the outstanding voting stock owned by the interested stockholder) the voting stock owned by directors who are also officers or held in employee benefit plans in which the employees do not have a confidential right to tender or vote stock held by the plan); or (iii) on or subsequent to such time the business combination is approved by the board of directors of such corporation and authorized at a meeting of stockholders by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the outstanding voting stock of such corporation not owned by the interested stockholder. We believe these provisions will protect our stockholders from coercive or otherwise unfair takeover tactics by requiring potential acquirers to negotiate with our Board of Directors and by providing our Board of Directors with more time to assess any acquisition proposal. These provisions are not intended to make us immune from takeovers. However, these provisions will apply even if the offer may be considered beneficial by some stockholders and could delay or prevent an acquisition that our Board of Directors determines is in the best interests of us and our stockholders. These provisions may also prevent or discourage attempts to remove and replace incumbent directors.