Nerdy (NRDY) Risk Analysis

The trading market for our Class A Common Stock may be influenced by the research and reports that equity research analysts publish about us and our business. We do not have any control over the analysts or the content and opinions included in their reports. The price of our stock could decline if one or more equity research analysts downgrade our stock or issue other unfavorable commentary or research. If one or more equity research analysts ceases coverage of our company or fails to publish reports on us regularly, demand for our stock could decrease, which in turn could cause our stock price or trading volume to decline.

Concentration of ownership among members of our senior management, our existing directors, and principal stockholders may prevent new investors from influencing significant corporate decisions. As a result, members of our senior management, our existing directors, and principal stockholders, would be able to significantly influence all matters requiring stockholder approval, including the election and removal of directors, any merger, consolidation, sale of all or substantially all of our assets or other significant corporate transactions. For example, Charles Cohn, our Founder, Chairman, President, and Chief Executive Officer, beneficially owns a significant portion of our Common Stock. Together with his spouse, he beneficially owns approximately 48.7% of our outstanding Class A Common Stock, assuming conversion of their Class B common stock and all other shares of Class B common stock. So long as Mr. Cohn beneficially owns certain specified percentages of our Class A Common Stock, Mr. Cohn will have rights to nominate up to three directors to our Board of Directors, and will also have consent rights with respect to other parties' nominees. Moreover, some of these persons or entities may have interests different than yours. For example, because many of these stockholders have held their shares for a long period, they may be more interested in selling our company to an acquirer than other investors, or they may want us to pursue strategies that deviate from the interests of other stockholders.

Our bylaws specify that, unless we consent in writing to the selection of an alternative forum, the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware will be the sole and exclusive forum for most legal actions involving actions brought against us by stockholders; provided that, if and only if the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware dismisses any such action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, such action may be brought in another state or federal court sitting in the State of Delaware. Our bylaws provide that the federal district courts of the U.S. will be the exclusive forum for the resolution of any complaint asserting a cause of action against us or any of our directors, officers, employees, or agents and arising under the Securities Act. We believe these provisions may benefit us by providing increased consistency in the application of Delaware law and federal securities laws by chancellors and judges, as applicable, particularly experienced in resolving corporate disputes, efficient administration of cases on a more expedited schedule relative to other forums, and protection against the burdens of multi-forum litigation. However, these provisions may have the effect of discouraging lawsuits against our directors and officers. The choice of forum provision requiring that the Court of Chancery of the State of Delaware be the exclusive forum for certain actions would not apply to suits brought to enforce any liability or duty created by the Exchange Act. There is uncertainty as to whether a court would enforce such provisions, and the enforceability of similar choice of forum provisions in other companies' charter documents has been challenged in legal proceedings. While the Delaware courts have determined that such choice of forum provisions are facially valid, a stockholder may nevertheless seek to bring a claim in a venue other than those designated in the exclusive forum provisions, and there can be no assurance that such provisions will be enforced by a court in those other jurisdictions. If a court were to find these types of provisions to be inapplicable or unenforceable, and if a court were to find the exclusive forum provision in our bylaws to be inapplicable or unenforceable in an action, we may incur additional costs associated with resolving the dispute in other jurisdictions, which could materially adversely affect our business.

Our Certificate of Incorporation, Bylaws, and the Delaware General Corporation Law, contain provisions that could have the effect of rendering more difficult, delaying, or preventing an acquisition deemed undesirable by our Board and therefore depress the trading price of our Class A Common Stock. These provisions could also make it difficult for stockholders to take certain actions, including electing directors who are not nominated by the current members of our Board of Directors or taking other corporate actions, including effecting changes in our management. Among other things, our governing documents, include provisions regarding: - the ability of our Board to issue shares of preferred stock, including "blank check" preferred stock, and to determine the price and other terms of those shares, including preferences and voting rights, without stockholder approval, which could be used to significantly dilute the ownership of a hostile acquirer;- the limitation of the liability of, and the indemnification of, our directors and officers;- a prohibition on stockholder action by written consent, which forces stockholder action to be taken at an annual or special meeting of stockholders after such date and could delay the ability of stockholders to force consideration of a stockholder proposal or to take action, including the removal of directors;- the requirement that a special meeting of stockholders may be called only by the Chief Executive Officer, the Chairman of the Board, or our Board, which could delay the ability of stockholders to force consideration of a proposal or to take action, including the removal of directors;- controlling the procedures for the conduct and scheduling of board of directors and stockholder meetings;- the ability of our Board to amend the bylaws, which may allow our Board to take additional actions to prevent an unsolicited takeover and inhibit the ability of an acquirer to amend the bylaws to facilitate an unsolicited takeover attempt; and - advance notice procedures with which stockholders must comply to nominate candidates to our Board or to propose matters to be acted upon at a stockholders' meeting, which could preclude stockholders from bringing matters before annual or special meetings of stockholders and delay changes in our Board, and also may discourage or deter a potential acquirer from conducting a solicitation of proxies to elect the acquirer's own slate of directors or otherwise attempting to obtain control of our company. These provisions, alone or together, could delay or prevent hostile takeovers and changes in control or changes in our Board or management.