Hyrecar (HYREQ) Risk Analysis

The trading market for our common stock will rely in part on the research and reports that industry or financial analysts publish about us, our business, our markets and our competitors. We do not control these analysts. If securities analysts do not cover our common stock, the lack of research coverage may adversely affect the market price of our common stock. Furthermore, if one or more of the analysts who do cover us downgrade our stock or if those analysts issue other unfavorable commentary about us or our business, our stock price would likely decline. If one or more of these analysts cease coverage of us or fails to regularly publish reports on us, we could lose visibility in the market and interest in our stock could decrease, which in turn could cause our stock price or trading volume to decline and may also impair our ability to expand our business with existing customers and attract new customers.

We expect that additional capital will be needed in the future to continue our planned operations, including research and development, increased marketing, hiring new personnel, efforts to expand our business, and continuing activities as an operating public company. To the extent we raise additional capital by issuing equity securities, our shareholders may experience substantial dilution. We may sell common stock, convertible securities or other equity securities in one or more transactions at prices and in a manner we determine from time to time. If we sell common stock, convertible securities or other equity securities in more than one transaction, investors may be materially diluted by subsequent sales. Such sales may also result in material dilution to our existing shareholders, and new investors could gain rights superior to our existing shareholders.

We are an "emerging growth company," as defined in the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act of 2012 (the "JOBS Act"), and we intend to take advantage of certain exemptions from various reporting requirements that are applicable to other public companies that are not "emerging growth companies" including not being required to comply with the auditor attestation requirements of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, reduced disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation in our periodic reports and proxy statements, and exemptions from the requirements of holding a nonbinding advisory vote on executive compensation and shareholder approval of any golden parachute payments not previously approved. In addition, pursuant to Section 107 of the JOBS Act, as an "emerging growth company" we intend to take advantage of the extended transition period provided in Section 7(a)(2)(B) of the Securities Act, for complying with new or revised accounting standards. In other words, an "emerging growth company" can delay the adoption of certain accounting standards until those standards would otherwise apply to private companies. We cannot predict if investors will find our common stock less attractive because we may rely on these exemptions. If some investors find our common stock less attractive as a result, there may be a less active trading market for our common stock and our stock price may be more volatile. We may take advantage of these reporting exemptions until we are no longer an "emerging growth company." We will remain an "emerging growth company" until the earliest of (i) the last day of the fiscal year in which we have total annual gross revenues of $1.07 billion or more; (ii) the last day of our fiscal year following the fifth anniversary of the date of the completion of our initial public offering; (iii) the date on which we have issued more than $1 billion in nonconvertible debt during the previous three years; or (iv) the date on which we are deemed to be a large accelerated filer under the rules of the SEC.

Provisions in our amended and restated certificate of incorporation and our bylaws may delay or prevent an acquisition of us or a change in our management. These provisions include a classified board of directors, a prohibition on actions by written consent of our stockholders, and the ability of the board of directors to issue preferred stock without stockholder approval. In addition, because we are incorporated in Delaware, we are governed by the provisions of Section 203 of the Delaware General Corporation Law, or the DGCL, which prohibits stockholders owning in excess of 15% of the outstanding combined organization voting stock from merging or combining with the combined organization. Although we believe these provisions collectively will provide for an opportunity to receive higher bids by requiring potential acquirers to negotiate with our board of directors, they would apply even if the offer may be considered beneficial by some stockholders. In addition, these provisions may frustrate or prevent any attempts by our stockholders to replace or remove then-current management by making it more difficult for stockholders to replace members of the board of directors, which is responsible for appointing the members of management.

Our corporate documents and the DGCL contain provisions that may enable our board of directors to resist a change in control of the Company even if a change in control were to be considered favorable by our stockholders. These provisions: -   stagger the terms of our board of directors and require 66 and 2/3% stockholder voting to remove directors, who may only be removed for cause;         -   authorize our board of directors to issue "blank check" preferred stock and to determine the rights and preferences of those shares, which may be senior to our common stock, without prior stockholder approval;         -   establish advance notice requirements for nominating directors and proposing matters to be voted on by stockholders at stockholders' meetings;         -   prohibit our stockholders from calling a special meeting and prohibit stockholders from acting by written consent;         -   require 66 and 2/3% stockholder voting to effect certain amendments to our certificate of incorporation and bylaws; and         -   prohibit cumulative voting in the election of directors, which limits the ability of minority stockholders to elect director candidates. These provisions could discourage, delay or prevent a transaction involving a change in control of us. These provisions could also discourage proxy contests and make it more difficult for stockholders to elect directors of their choosing and cause us to take other corporate actions our stockholders desire.