Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste SA de CV (AED) Risk Analysis

Colombia has experienced several periods of criminal violence over the past four decades, primarily due to the activities of guerilla, paramilitary groups and drug cartels. In remote regions of the country, where governmental presence is minimal, these groups have exerted influence over the local population and funded their activities by protecting and rendering services to drug traffickers. In response, the Colombian government has implemented security measures and have strengthened its military and police forces, including the creation of specialized units. Despite these efforts, drug-related crime and guerrilla and paramilitary activity continue to exist in Colombia. Any possible escalation in the violence associated with these activities may have a negative impact on the Colombian economy in the future. In the context of any political instability, allegations have been made against members of the Colombian government concerning possible ties with paramilitary groups. These allegations may undermine the Colombian government's credibility, which could in turn negatively impact the Colombian economy and tourism and our operations there in the future. In November 2016, the Colombian government signed a revised peace agreement with the FARC guerillas that sought their demobilization and the end of the decades-long armed conflict. That same month, the revised peace agreement was ratified by both houses of Colombian Congress and the Colombian government formally entered into the peace agreement with FARC without submitting the agreement to the voters for their approval. On January 18, 2019, President Ivan Duque announced the end of negotiations for a peace agreement with the ELN, the second-largest guerilla group in the country. This decision was the result of a terrorist attack on a police station based in Bogotá, perpetrated by the ELN. The Colombian government has had military confrontations with the ELN and with dissident groups that a peace agreement had been signed with. Conflicts between guerrilla and paramilitary fighters for control of the territory vacated by former groups who reintegrated into civil society has caused outbreaks of violence in the country, which have also been met with responses by the Colombian government. In addition, some ex-guerrilla members continue to carry out illegal activities, including micro-drug trafficking and robbery, leading to the establishment of criminal bands in the Antioquia, Cauca and Valle del Cauca regions. On January 2, 2022, violent confrontations broke out at the Arauca department in Colombia, as members of the ELN fought with dissidents of the FARC. The conflict arose over control of illegal economies, including drug trafficking to Venezuela, and led to deaths, illegal detentions, mass displacements and risk of forced displacement in border municipalities, specifically in Tame, Fortul, Saravena and Arauquita. The conflict continued to escalate over the following months, and the feasibility of a potential agreement between the ELN and FARC remains uncertain. On November 4, 2022, the Colombian Congress approved Law 418 establishing the "Paz Total" program, pursuant to which the government will establish political dialogues with armed groups in different regions of the country, in furtherance of achieving peace. On December 31 of 2022, President Gustavo Petro announced a bilateral ceasefire, starting on January 1, 2023 until June 30, 2023, which would open a round of dialogue between the government and ELN, Segunda Marquetalia, Estado Mayor Central, Autodefensas Gaitanistas de Colombia (AGC) and the Sierra Nevada armed group. The second round of the dialogue between the Colombian Government and the ELN ended in March 2023, which was followed by two subsequent rounds in June and August, 2023. Despite the referred negotiation efforts, parties have failed to achieve a full ceasefire and hostilities remained during 2023 and continue as of the date of this report. Furthermore, in March 2023, President Gustavo Petro announced the commencement of a peace process with the FARC dissidents who did not sign the peace agreement in 2016. As of the date of this annual report, peace dialogues are being held with the different armed groups to reinforce security. In addition, Colombia has recently experienced substantial migration from Venezuela, leading to strained relations between the nations, including with respect to commercial relations. Air transport between Colombia and Venezuela has slowed in part due to political and economic instability in Venezuela. Recently, the Colombian and Venezuelan governments have declared their intention to expand air routes between the two countries. As a consequence, several airlines have resumed or commenced operating commercial flights between both countries, including Avianca, which resumed its commercial route from Bogota to Caracas in December, 2023, and Wingo, which started operating a commercial route from our José María Córdova Airport in Rionegro to Caracas in January, 2024. On August 7, 2022, Gustavo Petro, candidate for the left-wing "Pacto Histórico" party, was elected President of Colombia. Although throughout history elected governments (and the Colombian Congress) have pursued free market economic policies, with almost no economic interventions, we cannot predict which policies will be adopted by the new government or congress and whether those policies would have a negative impact on the Colombian economy or our business operations and financial performance. Our Colombian operations could be adversely impacted by rapidly changing economic, political and social conditions in Colombia and by the Colombian government's response to such economic and social conditions. Additionally, any changes in the ruling government, regulations or policies relating to aeronautical services or investment, or shifts in political attitudes in Colombia are beyond our control.

Our business and results of operations at our Colombian airports are dependent on the economic conditions prevailing in Colombia. The Colombian government has historically exercised substantial influence on its economy, and is likely to continue to implement policies that will have an impact on the business and results of operations of entities in the country. Potential changes in laws, public policies and regulations may cause instability and volatility in Colombia, which could have a material adverse impact on our business and results of operations. The Colombian Peso ("COP") has fallen by over 20.1% against the U.S. dollar during the twelve month period ended December 31, 2023. A depreciation of the COP could affect the Company's business in the following ways: (i) international passengers and international flights pay tariffs reported in U.S. dollars; while these tariffs are generally collected in COP, any depreciation of the COP has a positive impact on the Company's results from operations, which are reported in COP; (ii) as the Company has cash balances denominated in U.S. dollars; a depreciation in the Mexican peso would result in higher cash balances when converted to COP, thus causing foreign exchange gains; and (iii) the Company has financial liabilities denominated in U.S. dollars; a depreciation in the COP results in higher debt balances when converted to COP, thus causing foreign exchange losses. On August 7, 2022, Gustavo Petro, candidate for the left-wing "Pacto Histórico" party, was elected President of Colombia. Although throughout history elected governments (and the Colombian Congress) have pursued free market economic policies, with almost no economic interventions, we cannot predict which policies will be adopted by the new government or congress and whether those policies would have a negative impact on the Colombian economy or our business operations and financial performance. On August 8, 2022, the Ministry of Finance submitted a tax reform bill to the Colombian Congress proposing several changes to the Colombian tax regime. The tax reform bill was passed as Law 2277 on December 13, 2022, and became effective starting January 1, 2023. This new law includes, among others: (i) a new permanent equity tax applicable to Colombian individuals and non-residents, which rates may vary from 0.5% to 1.5% based on the individual's net equity as of the first day of January of each year, (ii) an increase in the dividend tax rate for local and foreign shareholders (0% to 39% progressive marginal rates for Colombian individuals, and 20% flat withholding rate for non-resident shareholders), (iii) an increase in the long-term capital gains tax rate, from 10% to 15%, (iv) the elimination of specific tax benefits and exemptions, such as the exempt income applicable for entities that are part of the technological and creative sector ("Economía Naranja"), the tax incentive for the development of the Colombian farming sector, and the 27% preferential income tax rate applicable to large infrastructure investments ("Megainversiones"), among others, (v) a 3% tax benefit on the taxpayer's net income determined pursuant to Section 259-1 f the Colombian Tax Code, in connection with environmental-related, deductions related to employee trainings, expenses incurred in the conservation of cultural property, among others, (vi) a minimum corporate income tax of at least 15% based on effective tax rate (calculated on book profit with certain adjustments), (vii) taxes based on significant economic presence of certain commercial activities (primarily for non-resident persons and entities that provide digital services), and (viii) the elimination of the possibility to use 50% of the Industry and Commerce Tax (i.e., local tax levied on gross revenue derived from the provision of services, or the performance of commercial and industrial activities in Colombian municipalities) as an income tax credit. Additionally, the Colombian executive branch has recently presented bills to reform the national pension plan (which would contemplate, among other things, a pillar system based on age and condition of the affiliated, and changes to pension schemes applicable to women), as well as reforms to labor laws (which include amendments to the regulation of outsourcing and subcontracting schemes, service contracts, minimum daily working hours, digital work, informal and migrant work, among others). As of the date of this annual report, it is unclear how these bills could affect the Colombian economy or our business. Furthermore, in May 2023 the Colombian Congress approved the National Development Plan which regulates, among other things, territorial planning around watercourses, human safety, access to food, and climate change for the years 2024 through 2026. The National Development Plan has established the need to reform several airports to enhance tourism in certain regions. One of the projects is an extension of José María Córdova Airport in Rionegro. As of the date of this report, it is unclear how the new National Development Plan could affect the Colombian economy or our business. The scope and timing of the expansion project of José María Córdova Airport, and whether it will be developed under our concession agreement remains uncertain. Any potential reforms performed under our concession agreement would in any event require our consent. See "Item 4. Information on the Company – Colombian Regulatory Framework – National Development Plan." If the perception of improved overall stability in Colombia deteriorates or if foreign direct investment declines, the Colombian economy may face a downturn, which could impact international and domestic traffic at our Colombian airports, and negatively affect our results of operations.

Our financial condition and results of operation may be adversely affected by changes in Mexico's political climate to the extent that such changes affect the nation's economic policies, growth, stability, outlook or regulatory environment. The Mexican government has exercised, and continues to exercise, significant influence over the Mexican economy. Mexican governmental actions concerning the economy and state-owned enterprises could have a significant effect on Mexican private-sector entities in general, and us in particular, as well as on market conditions, prices and returns on securities, including our ADSs. The most recent presidential election took place in July 2018. Andrés Manuel López Obrador, presidential candidate for the National Regeneration Movement Party (Movimiento de Regeneración Nacional) ("Morena"), was elected President and took office on December 1, 2018, ending the Institutional Revolutionary Party's (Partido Revolucionario Institucional) ("PRI") hold on the presidency. Before taking office, López Obrador submitted to a national referendum the question of whether to continue construction of a new international airport in Mexico City, one of Mexico's most important infrastructure projects. Construction of the new international airport to replace Mexico City International Airport began in 2015. The referendum was carried out by a private company contracted by Morena and through mechanisms not necessarily envisioned in the Constitution. The result of the referendum, announced on October 28, 2018, was to discontinue construction on the new international airport and, in its stead, build a new airport network consisting of three airports near the Mexico City metropolitan area. On December 27, 2018, the López Obrador administration formally terminated work at the new international airport in Mexico City. The López Obrador administration instead decided to add additional runways to the military air base at Santa Lucia and build the Felipe Ángeles International Airport ("AIFA") to handle Mexico City air traffic. AIFA started operating on March 21, 2022. Our Mexican domestic passenger traffic is highly dependent upon the operations of the Mexico City International Airport, and we cannot assure you that AIFA's operations will not adversely affect the operations of the Mexico City International Airport. On November 24 and 25, 2018, López Obrador and Morena held another referendum. During this second referendum, voters approved the construction of a railway, labeled the Mayan Train, that would link Mayan archaeological and tourist sites in five southeastern states-Campeche, Chiapas, Quintana Roo, Tabasco and Yucatan. The Mayan Train was envisaged to be a four-year project costing U.S.$7.4 billion which will connect Palenque with Cancún. Although a series of protests and legal challenges have slowed the completion of the Mayan Train, a section of the project started operations on December 16, 2023 and the project is expected to be fully completed during the second quarter of 2024. We cannot assure you that the construction of the Mayan Train or any uncertainty around its construction will not impact the passenger traffic at our Mexican airports. In his statements after the announcement of the referendum results, López Obrador expressed his intention to, during his term as president, to carry out more such referendums on matters, that in his judgment and that of his administration, are of national interest, and that the results of such referendums will be adopted without taking into account the economic impact they could have on financial markets. We cannot predict if and to what degree such a policy could generate economic instability in Mexico, nor if our operations or the legal framework under which we operate could be affected. After mid-term elections on June 6, 2021, Morena lost the absolute majority in the Cámara de Diputados (Chamber of Deputies) that it had held since 2018. However, it remains the party that individually holds the most seats relative to any other party in Mexico. General elections for president, Chamber of Deputies and Senate will take place on June 2, 2024. We cannot predict the impact that political developments in Mexico will have on the Mexican economy nor can provide any assurances that these events, over which we have no control, will not have an adverse effect on our business, financial condition, results of operations,cash flows, prospects and/or the market price of our ADSs. The Mexican government could implement significant changes in laws, policies and regulations, which could affect the economic and political situation in Mexico. On February 2, 2023, López Obrador issued a presidential decree pursuant to which all cargo and freight flights departing from the Mexico City International Airport would be relocated to depart from the AIFA airport. On July 7, 2023 the SICT published in the Official Gazette of the Federation that cargo airlines operating at the Mexico City International Airport had to move their operations to another terminal by September 1, 2023. While we do not believe that these legislative reforms will have a negative impact in the short term, we cannot predict how these regulatory changes will affect our business, financial condition, results of operations, cash flows, prospects, and/or the market price of our ADSs.

In the past, Mexico has experienced economic crises, caused by internal and external factors, characterized by exchange rate instability (including large devaluations), high inflation, high domestic interest rates, economic contraction, a reduction of international capital flows, a reduction of liquidity in the banking sector and high unemployment rates. We cannot assume that such conditions will not return or that such conditions will not have a material adverse effect on our business, financial condition or results of operations. In 2021, Mexican GDP increased by 5.0% and inflation increased to 7.4%. In 2022, Mexican GDP increased by 3.1% and inflation increased to 7.8%. In 2023, Mexican GDP increased by 3.1% and inflation decreased to 4.7%. In 2021 and 2022 the outbreak of COVID-19 adversely affected the economy and financial markets of Mexico and its trading partners. While currently COVID-19 is no longer materially adversely affecting Mexico's economy, the extent to which any future COVID-19 outbreak may impact the Mexican economy is uncertain, as is the extent of further Mexican economic recovery, if any. If the Mexican economy does not continue to recover, if inflation or interest rates increase significantly or if the Mexican economy is otherwise adversely impacted, our business, financial condition or results of operations could be materially and adversely affected.

Although a substantial portion of our revenues is derived from foreign tourism, Mexican domestic passengers in recent years have represented approximately half of the passenger traffic volume in our Mexican airports. In addition, a significant amount of our assets are located, and a significant segment of our operations are conducted, in Mexico. As a result, our business, financial condition and results of operation could be adversely affected by the general condition of the Mexican economy, by a devaluation of the peso, by inflation and high interest rates in Mexico, or by political developments in Mexico.

The results of presidential and congressional action in the United States could result in significant changes in, and uncertainty with respect to, immigration and border policy. Immigration reform, especially with respect to Mexico, continues to attract significant attention in the public arena and U.S. Congress. If new federal immigration legislation is enacted, such laws may contain provisions that could make it more difficult for Mexican and Colombian citizens to travel between Mexico and Colombia, respectively, and the United States. In addition, new immigration, border and trade legislation could lead to uncertain economic conditions in Mexico that may affect leisure or business travel, including travel to and from Mexico. Such restrictions could have a material adverse effect on our passenger traffic results.