Cel-Sci (CVM) Risk Analysis

On February 18, 2015, CEL-SCI adopted new bylaws which include a fee-shifting provision in Article X for stockholder claims. Article X provides that in the event any stockholder initiates or asserts a claim against CEL-SCI, or any of its officers or directors, including any derivative claim or claim purportedly filed on CEL-SCI’s behalf, and the stockholder does not obtain a judgment on the merits that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought, then the stockholder will be obligated to reimburse CEL-SCI and any of its officers or directors named in the action, for all fees, costs and expenses of every kind and description that CEL-SCI or its officers or directors may incur in connection with the claim. In adopting Article X, it is the intent that: · all actions, including federal securities law claims, would be subject to Article X; · the phrase “a judgment on the merits” means the determination by a court of competent jurisdiction on the matters submitted to the court; · the phrase “substantially achieves, in both substance and amount” means the plaintiffs in the action would be awarded at least 90% of the relief sought; · only persons who were stockholders at the time an action was brought would be subject to Article X; and · only the directors or officers named in the action would be allowed to recover. The fee-shifting provision contained in Article X of the bylaws is not limited to specific types of actions, but is rather potentially applicable to the fullest extent permitted by law. Fee-shifting bylaws are relatively new and untested. The case law and potential legislative action on fee-shifting bylaws are evolving and there exists considerable uncertainty regarding the validity of, and potential judicial and legislative responses to, such bylaws. For example, it is unclear whether the ability to invoke the fee-shifting bylaw in connection with claims under the federal securities laws would be pre-empted by federal law. Similarly, it is unclear how courts might apply the standard that a claiming stockholder must obtain a judgment that substantially achieves, in substance and amount, the full remedy sought. The application of the fee-shifting bylaw in connection with such claims, if any, will depend in part on future developments of the law. CEL-SCI cannot assure its shareholders that CEL-SCI will or will not invoke the fee-shifting bylaw in any particular dispute. In addition, given the unsettled state of the law related to fee-shifting bylaws, such as CEL-SCI’s, CEL-SCI may incur significant additional costs associated with resolving disputes with respect to such bylaw, which could adversely affect CEL-SCI’s business and financial condition. If a stockholder that brings any such claim, suit, action or proceeding is unable to obtain the required judgment, the attorneys’ fees and other litigation expenses that might be shifted to a claiming stockholder are potentially significant. This fee-shifting bylaw may therefore dissuade or discourage stockholders and their attorneys from initiating lawsuits or claims against CEL-SCI or its directors and officers. In addition, it may impact the fees, contingency or otherwise, required by potential plaintiffs’ attorneys to represent the stockholders or otherwise discourage plaintiffs’ attorneys from representing the stockholders at all. As a result, this bylaw may limit the ability of stockholders to alter CEL-SCI’s management and direction, particularly through litigation or the threat of litigation.