Wallbox (WBX) Risk Analysis

Under Dutch law, the General Meeting is authorized to issue Shares or to grant rights to subscribe for Shares and to restrict and/or exclude statutory pre-emptive rights in relation to the issuance of Shares or the granting of rights to subscribe for Shares. The General Meeting may designate the Board competent to issue Shares (or grant rights to subscribe for Shares) and to determine the issue price and other conditions of the issue for a specified period not exceeding five years (which period can be extended from time to time for further periods not exceeding five years) and, for a period of 5 years commencing on the date of completion of the Business Combination, the Board has been irrevocably authorized to issue Shares (and to grant rights to subscribe for Shares). Further thereto, each shareholder has a pre-emptive right in proportion to the aggregate amount of its Shares upon the issuance of Shares (or the granting of rights to subscribe for Shares). This pre-emptive right does not apply to: (i) Shares issued to our employees or a subsidiary of ours as referred to in Section 2:24b Dutch Civil Code, (ii) Shares that are issued against payment other than in cash; and (iii) Shares issued to a person exercising a previously granted right to subscribe for Shares. The pre-emptive rights in respect of newly issued Shares or the granting of rights to subscribe for Shares may be restricted or excluded by a resolution of the General Meeting. Pre-emptive rights may also be limited or excluded by a resolution of the Board if the Board has been designated thereto by the General Meeting for a specific period and with due observance of applicable statutory provisions, and the Board has also been designated to issue Shares. A resolution of the General Meeting to limit or exclude pre-emptive rights or a resolution to designate the Board thereto, can only be adopted at the proposal of the Board, and requires a majority of at least two-thirds of the votes cast, if less than half of our issued share capital is present or represented at the General Meeting. Unless otherwise stipulated at its grant the designation may not be withdrawn. If the resolution of the General Meeting to issue Shares or to designate the authority to issue Shares to the Board is detrimental to the rights of holders of a specific class of Shares, the validity of such resolution of the General Meeting requires a prior or simultaneous approval by the group of holders of such class of Shares. For a period of 5 years commencing on the date of completion of the Business Combination, the Board has been irrevocably authorized to limit or exclude pre-emptive rights in respect of Shares.

Under Dutch law, various protective measures are possible and permissible within the boundaries set by Dutch law and Dutch case law, among which, in accordance with the DCGC, shareholders having the right to put an item on the agenda under the rules described above shall exercise such right only after consulting the Board in that respect. If one or more shareholders intend to request that an item be put on the agenda that may result in a change in our strategy (for example, the dismissal of Directors), the Board must be given the opportunity to invoke a reasonable period to respond to such intention. Such period shall not exceed 180 (hundred eighty) days (or such other period as may be stipulated for such purpose by Dutch law and/or the DCGC from time to time). If invoked, the Board must use such response period for further deliberation and constructive consultation, in any event with the shareholders(s) concerned, and must explore the alternatives. At the end of the response time, the Board must report on this consultation and the exploration of alternatives to the General Meeting. The response period may be invoked only once for any given General Meeting and shall not apply: (a) in respect of a matter for which a response period has been previously invoked; or (b) if a shareholder holds at least 75% of our issued share capital as a consequence of a successful public bid. The response period may also be invoked in response to shareholders or others with meeting rights under Dutch law requesting that a General Meeting be convened, as described above. Pursuant to Dutch law, one or more shareholders and/or other persons with meeting rights under Dutch law who individually or jointly represent at least 10% of our issued share capital, may request the Board to convene a General Meeting setting out in detail the matters to be discussed. If the Board has not taken the steps necessary to ensure that such meeting can be held within 6 (six) weeks after the request, the requesting shareholder(s) and or other persons with meeting rights may at their request be authorized by the competent Dutch court in preliminary relief proceedings to convene a General Meeting. The court shall refuse the application if it does not appear that the applicant(s) has/have previously requested the Board to convene a General Meeting and the Board has not taken the necessary steps so that the General Meeting could be held within 6 (six) weeks after the request. Such a request to the Board is subject to certain additional requirements. Additionally, the applicant must have a reasonable interest in the meeting being held. Further thereto, in May 2021, a bill came into force that introduces a statutory cooling-off period of up to 250 days during which the General Meeting would not be able to dismiss, suspend or appoint members of the Board (or amend the provisions in the Articles of Association governing these matters) unless these matters were proposed by the Board. This cooling-off period could be invoked by the Board in the event: (a)shareholders, using either their shareholder proposal right or their right to request a General Meeting, propose an agenda item for the General Meeting to dismiss, suspend or appoint a Director (or to amend any provision in the Articles of Association dealing with those matters); or (b)a public offer for has been announced or made without agreement having been reached with on such offer, provided, in each case, that in the opinion of the Board such proposal or offer materially conflicts with the interests of and its business. The cooling-off period, if invoked, ends upon the earliest of the following events: (a)the expiration of 250 days from: (i)in case of shareholders using their shareholder proposal right, the day after the deadline for making such proposal for the next General Meeting has expired;(ii)in case of Shareholders using their right to request a General Meeting, the day when they obtain court authorization to do so; or (iii)in case of a public offer as described above being made without agreement having been reached with on such offer, the first following day;(b)the day after a public offer without agreement having been reached with us on such offer, having been declared unconditional; or (c)the Board deciding to end the cooling-off period earlier. In addition, one or more shareholders that may (jointly) exercise the shareholder proposal right at the time that the cooling-off period is invoked, may request the Enterprise Chamber (Ondernemingskamer) of the Amsterdam Court of Appeals (Gerechtshof Amsterdam) for early termination of the cooling-off period. The Enterprise Chamber must rule in favor of the request if the shareholders can demonstrate that: (a)the Board, in light of the circumstances at hand when the cooling-off period was invoked, could not reasonably have come to the conclusion that the relevant shareholder proposal or hostile offer constituted a material conflict with the interests of and its business;(b)the Board cannot reasonably believe that a continuation of the cooling-off period would contribute to careful policy-making;(c)if other defensive measures, having the same purpose, nature and scope as the cooling-off period, have been activated during the cooling-off period and are not terminated or suspended at the relevant shareholders' written request within a reasonable period following the request (i.e., no ‘stacking' of defensive measures). During the cooling-off period, if invoked, the Board must gather all relevant information necessary for a careful decision-making process. In this context, the Board must at least consult with shareholders representing at least 3% of our issued share capital at the time the cooling-off period was invoked and with our works council, if applicable. Formal statements expressed by these stakeholders during such consultations must be published on our website to the extent these stakeholders have approved that publication. Ultimately one week following the last day of the cooling-off period, the Board must publish a report in respect of its policy and conduct of affairs during the cooling-off period on our website. This report must also remain available for inspection by our shareholders and others with meeting rights under Dutch law at our office and must be tabled for discussion at the next General Meeting. Finally, in this respect, certain provisions of the Articles of Association may also make it more difficult for a third-party to acquire control of our Company or effect a change in the composition of the Board, including that suspension or dismissal of directors other than at the proposal of the Board will require a two-thirds majority of the votes cast, representing more than one half of our issued capital.

The tax consequences in connection with the acquisition, ownership and disposal of the Shares and/or Warrants may differ from the tax consequences in connection with the acquisition, ownership and disposal of securities in another entity and may also differ depending on such an investor's respective circumstances including, without limitation, where such an investor is a tax resident. Any such tax consequences could be materially adverse to an investor and, therefore, each investor should seek its own tax advice in respect of the tax consequences in connection with the acquisition, ownership and disposal of the Shares and/or Warrants.

We are an emerging growth company ("EGC") as defined in the JOBS Act, and we intend to take advantage of certain exemptions from various reporting requirements that are applicable to other public companies that are not EGCs, including not being required to comply with the auditor attestation requirements of Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act reduced disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation in periodic reports and proxy statements, and exemptions from the requirements of holding a nonbinding advisory vote on executive compensation and stockholder approval of any golden parachute payments not previously approved. Investors may find the common stock less attractive because we will continue to rely on these exemptions. If some investors find the common stock less attractive as a result, there may be a less active trading market for the Class A Shares, and the stock price may be more volatile. An EGC may elect to delay the adoption of new or revised accounting standards. With us making this election, Section 102(b)(2) of the JOBS Act allows us to delay adoption of new or revised accounting standards until those standards apply to non-public business entities. As a result, the financial statements contained herein and those that we will file in the future may not be comparable to companies that comply with public business entities revised accounting standards effective dates.

As a foreign private issuer, we have the option to follow certain home country corporate governance practices rather than those of the NYSE, provided that we disclose the requirements we are not following and describe the home country practices we are following. We intend to rely on this "foreign private issuer exemption" with respect to NYSE rules requiring shareholder approval. We may in the future elect to follow home country practices with regard to other matters. As a result, our shareholders may not have the same protections afforded to shareholders of companies that are subject to all NYSE corporate governance requirements.

From time to time, we may look to fund our operations or enter into strategic transactions or acquisitions that provide for consideration in the form of our Class A Shares. To the extent that we issue Class A Shares or instruments that settle in Class A Shares, your ownership interest could be diluted, and the terms of these securities may include liquidation or other preferences that adversely affect your rights as a shareholder. Further, sales by us or our shareholders of a substantial number of Shares or the perception that these sales might occur, could cause the market price of Class A Shares to decline or could impair our ability to raise capital through a future sale of, or pay for acquisitions using, our equity securities. For example, in April 2023, we entered into the Equity Distribution Agreement (as defined below), pursuant to which we established an at-the-market program allowing certain banks, acting as our sales agents, to sell, from time to time, up to an aggregate of $100.0 million Class A Shares in sales made by any method permitted that is deemed an "at the market offering" as defined in Rule 415(a)(4) under the Securities Act, or, in negotiated transactions or block transactions. Additionally, during 2023, we consummated multiple private placement transactions and issued an aggregate of 29,193,089 Class A Shares. Refer to Item 5, "Operating and Financial Review and Prospects-B.Liquidity and Capital Resources-Sources of Liquidity."

An active trading market may not be sustained for Class A Shares. The lack of an active market may impair your ability to sell your shares at the time you wish to sell them or at a price that you consider reasonable. An inactive market may also impair our ability to raise capital by selling Class A Shares and may impair our ability to acquire other companies by using our shares as consideration.

The market price of Class A Shares could be highly volatile and may fluctuate substantially as a result of many factors, including, without limitation: - actual or anticipated fluctuations in our results of operations;- variance in our financial performance from the expectations of market analysts or others;- announcements by us or our competitors of significant business developments, changes in significant customers, acquisitions or expansion plans;- our involvement in litigation;- our sale of Class A Shares or other securities in the future;- market conditions in our industry;- changes in key personnel;- the trading volume of our Class A Shares;- changes in the estimation of the future size and growth rate of our markets; and - general economic, industry and market conditions, including, for example, the effects of recession or slow economic growth in the U.S. and abroad, interest rates, fuel prices, international currency fluctuations, corruption, political instability, acts of war, including the Russia/Ukraine conflict and the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic or other public health crises. In addition, the stock markets have experienced extreme price and volume fluctuations. Broad market and industry factors may materially harm the market price of Class A Shares, regardless of our operating performance. In the past, following periods of volatility in the market price of a company's securities, securities class action litigation has often been instituted against that company. If we were involved in any similar litigation, we could incur substantial costs and our management's attention and resources could be diverted.

Class B Shares have ten (10) votes per share, while Class A Shares have one (1) vote per share. our co-founders, Enric Asunción Escorsa and Eduard Castañeda, own all of the Class B Shares and collectively control approximately 55% of the voting power of our capital stock. Even though our co-founders are not party to any agreement that requires them to vote together, they may have interests that differ from yours and may vote in a way with which you disagree and which may be adverse to your interests. This concentrated control may have the effect of delaying, preventing or deterring a change in control of our Company, could deprive our shareholders of an opportunity to receive a premium for their capital stock as part of a sale of our Company, and might ultimately affect the market price of shares of Class A Shares. We cannot predict whether our dual class structure will result in a lower or more volatile market price of Class A Shares or in adverse publicity or other adverse consequences. For example, certain index providers have announced restrictions on including companies with multiple-class share structures in certain of their indexes. S&P Dow Jones and FTSE Russell have announced changes to their eligibility criteria for inclusion of shares of public companies on certain indices, including the S&P 500, pursuant to which companies with multiple classes of shares of common stock are excluded. In addition, several stockholder advisory firms have announced their opposition to the use of multiple class structures. As a result, our dual class structure may cause shareholder advisory firms to publish negative commentary about our corporate governance practices or otherwise seek to cause us to change our capital structure. Any such exclusion from indices or any actions or publications by stockholder advisory firms critical of our corporate governance practices or capital structure could adversely affect the value and trading market of Class A Shares.

The trading market for Class A Shares can be influenced by the research and reports that industry or securities analysts publish about us or our business. If industry analysts cease coverage of us, the trading price for Class A Shares would be negatively impacted. If any of the analysts who cover us issue an adverse or misleading opinion regarding us, our business model, our intellectual property or our stock performance, or if our results of operations fail to meet the expectations of analysts, our stock price would likely decline. If one or more of these analysts cease coverage of us or fail to publish reports on us regularly, we could lose visibility in the financial markets, which in turn could cause our stock price or trading volume to decline.