Estre Ambiental (ESTRF) Risk Analysis

The Registrant's corporate affairs are governed by our Memorandum and Articles, the Companies Law, as amended, and the common law of the Cayman Islands. The rights of shareholders to take action against the directors, actions by noncontrolling shareholders and the fiduciary responsibilities of our directors to us under Cayman Islands law are to a large extent governed by the common law of the Cayman Islands. The common law of the Cayman Islands is derived in part from comparatively limited judicial precedent in the Cayman Islands as well as from English common law, which has persuasive, but not binding, authority on a court in the Cayman Islands. The rights of our shareholders and the fiduciary responsibilities of our directors under Cayman Islands law are different from under statutes or judicial precedent in some jurisdictions in the United States. In particular, the Cayman Islands has a different body of securities laws from the United States and may provide significantly less protection to investors. In addition, some U.S. states, such as Delaware, have different bodies of corporate law than the Cayman Islands. We have been advised by our Cayman Islands legal counsel, Maples and Calder, that the courts of the Cayman Islands are unlikely (i) to recognize or enforce against us judgments of courts of the United States predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the securities laws of the United States or any State and (ii) in original actions brought in the Cayman Islands, to impose liabilities against us predicated upon the civil liability provisions of the securities laws of the United States or any State, so far as the liabilities imposed by those provisions are penal in nature. In those circumstances, although there is no statutory enforcement in the Cayman Islands of judgments obtained in the United States, the courts of the Cayman Islands will recognize and enforce a foreign money judgment of a foreign court of competent jurisdiction without retrial on the merits based on the principle that a judgment of a competent foreign court imposes upon the judgment debtor an obligation to pay the sum for which judgment has been given provided certain conditions are met. For a foreign judgment to be enforced in the Cayman Islands, such judgment must be final and conclusive and for a liquidated sum, and must not be in respect of taxes or a fine or penalty, inconsistent with a Cayman Islands judgment in respect of the same matter, impeachable on the grounds of fraud or obtained in a manner, and or be of a kind the enforcement of which is, contrary to natural justice or the public policy of the Cayman Islands (awards of punitive or multiple damages may well be held to be contrary to public policy). A Cayman Islands Court may stay enforcement proceedings if concurrent proceedings are being brought elsewhere. There is recent Privy Council authority (which is binding on the Cayman Islands Court) in the context of a reorganization plan approved by the New York Bankruptcy Court which suggests that due to the universal nature of bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings, foreign money judgments obtained in foreign bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings may be enforced without applying the principles outlined above. However, a more recent English Supreme Court authority (which is highly persuasive but not binding on the Cayman Islands Court), has expressly rejected that approach in the context of a default judgment obtained in an adversary proceeding brought in the New York Bankruptcy Court by the receivers of the bankruptcy debtor against a third party, and which would not have been enforceable upon the application of the traditional common law principles summarized above and held that foreign money judgments obtained in bankruptcy/insolvency proceedings should be enforced by applying the principles set out above, and not by the simple exercise of the Courts' discretion. Those cases have now been considered by the Cayman Islands Court. The Cayman Islands Court was not asked to consider the specific question of whether a judgment of a bankruptcy court in an adversary proceeding would be enforceable in the Cayman Islands, but it did endorse the need for active assistance of overseas bankruptcy proceedings. We understand that the Cayman Islands Court's decision in that case has been appealed and it remains the case that the law regarding the enforcement of bankruptcy/insolvency related judgments is still in a state of uncertainty.

Any future issuance of equity securities could dilute the interests of our shareholders and could substantially decrease the trading price of our ordinary shares. We may issue equity or equity-linked securities in the future, including pursuant to a private investment in public equity ("PIPE") or other offering of equity securities, for a number of reasons, including to finance our operations and business strategy (including in connection with acquisitions and other transactions), to adjust our ratio of debt to equity, to satisfy our obligations upon the exercise of then-outstanding options or other equity-linked securities, if any, in connection with the terms of any possible debt restructuring efforts, in connection with any judicial reorganization or for other reasons. We are not required to obtain shareholder approval for the issuance of additional ordinary shares, and investors should note that we are not required to comply with the NASDAQ rule requiring shareholder approval for issuances of additional securities exceeding 20% of our outstanding ordinary shares. See "Item 16. Corporate Governance."

If any significant shareholder sells large amounts of ordinary shares in the open market or in privately negotiated transactions, or if the market has expectations as to any such future sales, this could have the effect of increasing the volatility in the price of the ordinary shares and negatively impact the trading price of the ordinary shares.

We qualify as an "emerging growth company" as defined in Section 2(a)(19) of the Securities Act, as modified by the JOBS Act. As such, we are be eligible for and intend to take advantage of certain exemptions from various reporting requirements applicable to other public companies that are not emerging growth companies for as long as we continues to be an emerging growth company, including (i) the exemption from the auditor attestation requirements with respect to internal control over financial reporting under Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, (ii) the exemptions from say-on-pay, say-on-frequency and say-on-golden parachute voting requirements and (iii) reduced disclosure obligations regarding executive compensation in our periodic reports and proxy statements. We will remain an emerging growth company until the earliest of (i) the last day of the fiscal year in which the market value of our ordinary shares that are held by non-affiliates exceeds US$700 million as of June 30 of that fiscal year, (ii) the last day of the fiscal year in which we have total annual gross revenue of US$1.07 billion or more during such fiscal year (as indexed for inflation), (iii) the date on which we have issued more than US$1 billion in non-convertible debt in the prior three-year period or (iv) the last day of the fiscal year following the fifth anniversary of the date of the first sale of our ordinary shares in our initial public offering. In addition, Section 107 of the JOBS Act also provides that an emerging growth company can take advantage of the exemption from complying with new or revised accounting standards provided in Section 7(a)(2)(B) of the Securities Act as long as we are an emerging growth company. An emerging growth company can therefore delay the adoption of certain accounting standards until those standards would otherwise apply to private companies. we may elect not to avail itself of this exemption from new or revised accounting standards and, therefore, we may not be subject to the same new or revised accounting standards as other public companies that are not emerging growth companies. Investors may find our ordinary shares less attractive because we will rely on these exemptions, which may result in a less active trading market for the ordinary shares and our stock price may be more volatile.

Our Memorandum and Articles provide for a board of directors that is divided into three classes, each of which serves for a staggered term of three years. A staggered board makes it more difficult for shareholders to change a majority of the directors since only approximately one-third of the existing board of directors may be replaced at any election of directors. This arrangement may have the effect of keeping the current members of our board of directors in control for a longer period of time than shareholders may desire, and may impede any attempts to take over our company or change or remove our management.

An active, liquid trading market for our ordinary shares may not be maintained in the long term and we cannot be certain that any trading market for our ordinary shares will be sustained or that the present price will correspond to the future price at which our ordinary shares will trade. Loss of liquidity could increase the price volatility of our ordinary shares. Any additional issuance of our ordinary shares would dilute the positions of existing investors in our ordinary shares and could adversely affect the market price of our ordinary shares. We cannot assure you that our ordinary shares will not decline below their prevailing market price. You may be unable to sell your ordinary shares at a price that is attractive to you.

The trading market for our ordinary shares will be influenced by the research and reports that industry or securities analysts may publish about our company, our business, our market, or our competitors. Securities and industry analysts do not currently, and may never, publish research on our company. If no securities or industry analysts commence coverage of our company, our share price and trading volume would likely be negatively impacted. If any of the analysts who may cover our company change their recommendation regarding our shares adversely, or provide more favorable relative recommendations about our competitors, the price of our ordinary shares would likely decline. If any analyst who may cover our company were to cease coverage of our company or fail to regularly publish reports on our company, we could lose visibility in the financial markets, which in turn could cause our share price or trading volume to decline.