United Therapeutics (UTH) Risk Analysis

Certain provisions of Delaware law, our restated certificate of incorporation, and bylaws may prevent, delay, or discourage a merger, tender offer, or proxy contest; the assumption of control by a holder of a large block of our securities; and/or the replacement or removal of current management by our shareholders. For example, as a result of our conversion to a PBC, our Board is required to consider and balance the financial interests of shareholders, the interests of stakeholders materially affected by our conduct, and the pursuit of our specific public benefit purpose when evaluating takeover offers. This requirement of Delaware law may make our company a less attractive takeover target than a traditional for-profit corporation. Non-competition and all other restrictive covenants in most of our employment agreements will terminate upon a change of control that is not approved by our Board. Similarly, a change of control, under certain circumstances, could accelerate the vesting of outstanding stock options, and restricted stock units. Any increase in our stock price resulting from the announcement of a change of control, and our broad-based change of control severance program, under which our employees may be entitled to severance benefits if they are terminated without cause (or they terminate their employment for good reason) following a change of control, could make an acquisition of our company significantly more expensive to the purchaser. We enter into certain license agreements that generally prohibit our counterparties or their affiliates from taking necessary steps to acquire or merge with us, directly or indirectly throughout the term of the agreements, plus a specified period thereafter. We are also party to certain license agreements that restrict our ability to assign or transfer the rights licensed to us to third parties, including parties with whom we wish to merge, or those attempting to acquire us. These agreements often require that we obtain prior consent of the counterparties if we contemplate a change of control. If these counterparties withhold consent, related agreements could be terminated and we would lose related license rights. For example, Lilly and MannKind have the right to terminate our license agreements related to Adcirca and Tyvaso DPI, respectively, in the event of certain change of control transactions. These restrictive change of control provisions could impede or prevent mergers or other transactions that could benefit our shareholders.

We have never paid, and do not intend to pay, cash dividends. The terms of our current or future debt arrangements we may enter into may restrict us from doing so. As a result, the return on an investment in our common stock depends entirely upon the future appreciation, if any, in the price of our common stock.

Our bylaws provide that, to the fullest extent permitted by law, unless we agree in writing to an alternative forum, (1) the Delaware Court of Chancery (or, if such court does not have, or declines to accept, jurisdiction, another state court or a federal court located in Delaware) will be the exclusive forum for any complaint asserting any internal corporate claims, including claims in the right of the corporation based upon a violation of a duty by a current or former director, officer, employee, or shareholder in such capacity, or as to which the Delaware General Corporation Law confers jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery; and (2) the federal district courts will be the exclusive forum for any complaint asserting a cause of action arising under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. The choice of forum provision may limit our shareholders' ability to bring a claim in a forum that they find favorable for disputes with us or our directors, officers, or other employees, and may discourage such lawsuits. There is uncertainty as to whether a court would enforce this provision. If a court ruled the choice of forum provision was inapplicable or unenforceable in an action, we may incur additional costs to resolve such action in other jurisdictions. Our choice of forum provision is intended to apply to the fullest extent permitted by law to the above-specified types of actions and proceedings, including any derivative actions asserting claims under state law or the federal securities laws. Our shareholders will not be deemed, by operation of the choice of forum provision, to have waived our obligation to comply with all applicable federal securities laws and the rules and regulations thereunder.

We may not be able to achieve our public benefit purpose or realize the expected positive impacts from being a PBC. One of the primary distinctions between a PBC and a traditional Delaware for-profit corporation is that, in making decisions, the directors of a PBC have an obligation to balance the financial interests of shareholders, the interests of stakeholders materially affected by the PBC's conduct, and the pursuit of the corporation's specific public benefit purpose. The application of this balancing obligation may allow our directors to make decisions that they could not have made pursuant to the fiduciary duties applicable prior to PBC conversion. There is no guarantee that our Board will resolve conflicts among the financial interests of our shareholders, our public benefit purpose, or stakeholders materially affected by our conduct, in favor of our shareholders' financial interests. For instance, in a sale of control transaction, our Board would be required to consider and balance the factors listed above and might choose to accept an offer that does not maximize short-term shareholder value due to its consideration of other factors. This requirement of Delaware law may make our company a less attractive takeover target than a traditional for-profit corporation. A Delaware PBC must also provide its shareholders with a statement, at least every other year, as to the PBC's assessment of the success of its efforts to promote its public benefit purpose and the best interests of those materially affected by the PBC's conduct. If the public perceives that we are not successful in promoting our public benefit purpose, or that our pursuit of our public benefit purpose is having a negative effect on the financial interests of our shareholders, that perception could negatively affect our reputation, which could adversely affect our business, results of operations, and stock price. In addition, Delaware's PBC statute may be amended to require more explicit or burdensome reporting requirements that could increase the time and expense required to comply.